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REVIEW           OPEN ACCESS 
Triple Talaq Bill in India: Muslim Women as Political Subjects or Victims?  
Esita Sur† 
Abstract  
The recent proposed Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill 2017 has raised the 
new issues, which were long due to Muslim women in India. It has not only criminalised the practice 
of instant tin talaq (divorce), but also signifies the government’s intervention in defining the notion 
of gender justice to Muslim women. Importantly, this development not only highlights an emerging 
Muslim women’s activism in India but also an articulation of gender justice from within the 
community. However, an array of criticisms is also sprouting up against the Bill from different 
corners of the community, including Muslim women’s groups. The article is an attempt to address 
the multiple facets of the Bill; it also argues that the talaq issue alone cannot constitute the core of 
gender justice rather the interplay of various factors like Hindutva, communal violence and the 
marginal location of the Muslim community needs to taken into account to understand Muslim 
women’s question in India. 
Keywords: Gender Justice, Talaq-e-Biddat, Hindutva, Marginality and Muslim Women, India 
Introduction 
Since the 22nd August 2017, Muslim women 
have acquired a centre-stage in various debates 
and discussions, especially in the media. The 
Supreme Court’s judgment that the practice of 
instant triple talaq is unconstitutional created 
much hustle-bustle in the public sphere. The 
Shah Bano Case in 1985 and the subsequent 
legislation titled Muslim Women (Protection of 
Rights on Divorce) Act 1986 brought about the 
issues of divorce and maintenance into the 
limelight. In 2016, Shayara Bano had filed a 
petition in the apex court against the 
malpractice of triple talaq and became the part 
of that historical judgment. From 1985 to 2016, 
many Muslim women approached the court for 
justice. Moreover, the emergence of Muslim 
women’s groups like the Bharatiya Muslim 
Mahila Andolan (BMMA), the Awaaz-e-Niswaan 
(AeN) and the All India Muslim Women Personal 
Law Board (AIMWPLB) have raised voices on 
these gendered-cultural discriminations; ripples 
of these women’s activism against the 
malpractice of talaq and polygamy are also 
creating waves of resistance in different corners 
of society. I hope that their images as victims 
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may be, to some extent, altered as petitioners 
or fighters. In the light of these backdrops, this 
article is an attempt to review the proposed 
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Marriage) Bill 2017 that has failed to be passed 
in the Parliament of India. The first part of the 
article aims to contextualise Muslim women and 
the proposed bill. Following this, the article 
discusses the paradoxes of the bill and the 
political contexts entailed. Finally, it tries to 
answer as to whether the bill will mediate 
Muslim women’s empowerment.  
The Bill and Muslim Women in India: The 
Context 
Before different dimensions of the Muslim 
Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill 
are addressed, it is essential to locate Muslim 
women in the broader Indian context. Dominant 
perceptions of Muslim women in India have 
revolved around the tropes of talaq, polygamy, 
Muslim personal law and purdah (veiling) and it 
represents a homogenised image of these 
women’s victimhood. The issues like talaq and 
polygamy have gained more prominence over 
the socio-economic marginalisation in terms of 
projecting their identities as passive victims. As 
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the feminist lawyer and activist, Flavia Agnes 
mentions that the stories of discriminations and 
exploitation of Gudiya (1999)1 and Imrana 
(2005)2 get more weightage over those Muslim 
women’s agency- who has struggled for justice 
in the courtroom. Surprisingly, the term 
‘backwardness’ is always equated with these 
cultural practices but not with educational and 
economic marginalisation. Muslim women’s 
varied experiences based on class, region and 
sects can challenge this image; it also creates a 
space for locating Muslim women’s activism. 
Moreover, the community’s response to the 
issue of talaq and Muslim personal law reform 
has also been diverse. The Triple Talaq Bill also 
known as The Muslim Women’s (Protection of 
Rights on Marriage) Bill highlights both: Muslim 
women as victims and as agents of change. 
While the journey from Shah Bano (1985) to 
Shayara Bano case (2016) continues to depict 
their problems and vulnerabilities, it also throws 
light on their agency and resistance to 
patriarchal oppression. It has also exhibited how 
these women’s struggle for justice has created 
an array of reactions within the community and 
more space for politics and manipulation.    
                                                          
1 Gudiya’s case came into media focus when Mohammad 
Arif (her husband) had gone missing during the 1999 Kargil 
war. During the five-year absence of Arif, who was 
presumed to be dead after initially being declared a 
deserter, Gudiya had remarried Taufiq and carried his 
child. On his return to his native village, Arif found his wife 
Gudiya was married to Taufiq. However, the village 
council reunited Arif and Gudiya. Taufiq tried to get 
Gudiya back but the council ruled in favour of Arif, and 
Gudiya was made to live with Arif. Sadly, Gudiya passed 
away in December 2006 (Kumar 2006, 1). 
2 In 2005, a 70- year-old father-in-law in a remote village 
of Uttar Pradesh raped his daughter-in-law named 
Imrana. The religious leaders and the caste panchayat 
issued the fatwa (religious decree) via which Imrana had 
to marry her father-in-law and consider her husband as 
her stepson. The Women’s Commission and the state 
could not do anything on the ground that it was an 
internal affair of the community (Agnes 2012, 127). 
3 The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) 
Bill, 2017, PRS Legislative Research, available at: 
http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-muslim-women-
protection-of-rights-on-marriage-bill-2017-5008/ (last 
accessed on 27.02.2018). 
4 The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Marriage)Bill, 2017, Bill No. 247 of 2017, available at: PRS 
The article intends to examine different 
dimensions of the Bill. It also argues that the Bill 
should not be straight-jacketed under the guise 
of gender justice for Muslim women; rather the 
political field and socio-economic contexts, in 
which the community and women survive, must 
be taken into consideration. Therefore, the 
relationship between the Bill, women and 
overall condition of the community needs to be 
analysed in the Indian context. The proposed Bill 
for Muslim women must be located in the 
broader arena of culture, economy and politics; 
the question of gender justice cannot be 
imposed from the top; rather it has to be based 
on the marginal perspective. 
The Contradictory Dimensions of the Bill   
In this context, the Law and Justice Minister Mr 
Ravi Shankar Prasad introduced the Muslim 
Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill in 
December 20173 4 in the Lok Sabha.  This Bill has 
been shelved after the Rajya Sabha has sent it 
to the Select Committee for detailed scrutiny. It 
has also given rise to a bunch of criticisms, 
especially the clause on ‘criminalisation of 
talaq’. The Bill declares the pronouncement of 
talaq-e-biddat5 as illegal and void. According to 




0on%20Marriage)%20Bill,%202017.pdf (accessed on 
27.02.2018). 
5 Talaq is a procedure that can be initiated by the husband 
alone without the consent of his wife. Besides, the 
exercise of talaq is extra-judicial, and in no way subject to 
external check. Technically, the power of the husband to 
divorce is absolute. Talaq may be pronounced in a number 
of ways, e.g., (1) Ahsan-e-talaq (2) Hasan-e-talaq (3) 
Biddat-e-talaq. The Ahsan form of talaq does not take 
place in a single sitting nor can it take place during 
menstruation. Iddah is observed during the period 
following menstruation (that is tuhr or the purity) where 
two arbitrators from both sides are appointed to bring 
about reconciliation. During the iddah period, the 
marriage is not dissolved. If reconciliation takes place, the 
marriage is saved, and no nikah is needed. In Ahsan talaq, 
even after the third pronouncement of talaq, after the 
‘iddah’ period, the marriage is revocable (Sur 2014, 43-
52). The man can remarry his divorced wife. This practice 
is in accordance with the teaching of the Quran and 
according to the Sunna rules. Both the Sunni and Shia 
schools approve of talaq-e-ahsan. On the contrary, Talaq-
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clause 3 of the Bill, any pronouncement of talaq 
by a person upon his wife by words — either 
spoken or written or in any electronic form or in 
any other manner- shall be void and illegal. A 
man who pronounces talaq on his wife will be 
punished with a jail term and fine. This Bill also 
makes the pronouncement of talaq-e-biddat a 
non-bailable offence. Clause 4 of the Bill states, 
“Whoever pronounces talaq referred to in 
section 3 shall be punished with imprisonment 
for a term which may extend up to three years 
and fine”. Moreover, clauses 5 and 6 of the Bill 
highlights, “a married Muslim woman upon 
whom talaq is pronounced, shall be entitled to 
receive from her husband such amount of 
subsistence allowance for her and dependent 
children,” and “shall be entitled to custody of 
her minor children in the event of 
pronouncement of talaq by her husband” 
(Radhakrishnan, 2017). The Law and Justice 
Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad, in the statement 
of objects and reasons attached to the Bill, 
conveyed that this legislation would help in 
ensuring the larger Constitutional goals of 
gender justice and equality of married Muslim 
women and in securing their fundamental rights 
of non-discrimination and empowerment. 
Many had argued that there was no 
requirement of the Bill as the judgment was 
enough to protect the rights of these women. 
The ground realities exhibited that the instances 
of triple talaq continued even after the 
judgment. The legislation is required to maintain 
the gravity of the judgment. However, it 
contains not only contradictory but also 
arbitrary clauses that demand more debates 
and discussions to do a full proof act. The Bill, as 
passed by the Lok Sabha, is based on the 
following provisions: a) the ‘utterance’ of tin 
talaq in one setting non-bailable and a 
cognisable act; therefore, it leaves no room for 
reconciliation. A probable argument is: why 
should these women look for reconciliation with 
                                                          
e-Biddat is a form of divorce, which is criticised, as it goes 
against the rules laid down by the Quran. However, the 
Sunna approves it. In this form of talaq, the husband 
unilaterally, without the consent or knowledge of the 
wife, pronounces talaq. The husband can pronounce talaq 
once or three times simultaneously, without paying 
their husbands practising arbitrary talaq against 
them? Their socio-economic vulnerabilities and 
compulsions shape their choices for 
reconciliations. It also penalises a Muslim 
husband for a legally void act. The judgment had 
already declared that talaq-e-biddat is invalid 
and unconstitutional; therefore, it does not 
dissolve the marriage. How can the Bill penalise 
a Muslim husband for up to 3 years just for 
‘utterance’, which does not dissolve the 
marriage? During his imprisonment, how will 
the maintenance question be solved for a 
Muslim woman and their dependent children? 
The Bill proposes that Muslim woman can 
approach the District Magistrate regarding this 
issue. It ignores the fact there is a direct 
relationship between imprisonment, livelihood 
earning and maintenance. Moreover, the Bill 
makes utterance of tin-talaq as a non-bailable 
and non-cognisable act, which adds further 
complications for Muslim women. The 
dimension of ‘criminality’ in inter-personal 
relations may also be considered as detrimental 
to these women, as this leaves room for further 
manipulation. Are these women capable 
enough to handle these repercussions, 
especially the issue of the social boycott from 
the community? These provisions may further 
increase Muslim women’s dependence on 
Sharia Courts or Jamaat as the civil court 
procedures are getting more complicated with 
the ‘criminality’ aspect. Anindita Chakrabarty 
and Suchandra Ghosh’s study (2017) on Muslim 
Family Courts revealed the procedural 
dimension of Muslim personal law and raised a 
pertinent question: how are Muslim family and 
civil cases adjudicated in India? They have 
successfully pointed out that popular discourses 
highlight certain dimensions of Muslim personal 
law, but it hardly reflects how Muslim women 
take help from the multiple legal actors like 
Sharia courts, women’s groups, clergy and 
religious organisations. Even the Supreme Court 
attention to the fact whether the wife is in a state of tuhr. 
The Prophet did not approve of this form of divorce (Sur 
2015, 4-16). According to this form of talaq, a man would 
pronounce talaq three times in one sitting, and this would 
be understood as if talaq had been given thrice. 
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judgment in 2014 gave recognition to these 
religious adjudication units, known as 
“alternative dispute resolution” (ADR) forums in 
the legal landscape of family law in India and 
made it clear that the sharia court was an 
effective arbitrator, mediator, negotiator and 
conciliator in matters of family and civil disputes 
and were not in conflict with the secular 
judiciary (Chakrabarty and Ghosh, 2017). 
Therefore, is criminalising ‘utterance’ of legally 
nullified words a full-proof mechanism to secure 
gender justice? This stringent Bill may further 
aggravate a clear distinction between the 
procedural complications of civil law and 
community mechanisms for justice. 
The contradictory dimensions of this Bill will 
receive further clarity if it is compared to those 
Muslim-majority countries, which have already 
outlawed the practice of triple talaq. The Islamic 
countries like Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Egypt have reformed 
their divorce laws. The provision of 
criminalisation is valid in Bangladesh and 
Pakistan (Kohli and Narayanan, 2017). In these 
countries, precondition of divorce is based on 
the following points: a) failure of reconciliation 
between the husband and the wife is must for 
talaq; b) involvement of either the civil or 
arbitration court or the religious authority is an 
integral part of the process; c) moreover, the 
process of divorce is not complete without an 
overall enquiry on the causes of rift or reasons 
behind the failure of reconciliation by these 
authorities. In Turkey, the entire procedure 
takes place in the civil court only. The problem 
in India is that the provision of tin talaq has been 
misused via verbal and non-verbal forms like 
SMS, WhatsApp and email. Most importantly, 
this kind of pronouncement and occurrence 
always takes place without the consent of their 
wives and family members. Unfortunately, the 
religious authorities like Qazi and Maulana, 
sometimes, misinterpret their knowledge to 
suppress women’s rights. Comparative analysis 
enables us to understand that the Bill would 
                                                          
6 The BMMA is one of the Muslim women’s organisations, 
which emerged in 2007 in Mumbai. It mainly works 
against the practices of talaq and polygamy. This 
have given more emphasis on the mechanism of 
delivering justice rather than criminalising the 
process. 
In Shamim Ara case (2002), the Supreme Court 
had already laid down the process of divorce. 
The court was of the firm opinion that if talaq 
was to be effective, it had to be pronounced. 
The term ‘pronounce’ incorporates: ‘to 
proclaim, to utter formally, to declare and to 
articulate’. The verdict also emphasised that the 
interpretation of talaq must be by Quranic 
injunctions and a mere plea in the written 
statement submitted to the court that talaq was 
given cannot be treated as a pronouncement of 
talaq by the husband on the wife (Agnes 2012, 
65). Therefore, more importance would have 
been given to developing a proper institutional 
framework of delivering justice based on the 
Supreme Court judgment, 2017. Creation of a 
shortcut to gender justice is not much appealing 
to us. Importantly, it projects a lopsided view on 
gender justice, which remains political and does 
not consider the socio-economic wellbeing of 
these women. This Bill is a clear attempt to 
create a homogenised group of ‘oppressor 
Muslim husbands’ and ‘helpless Muslim women 
victims’. However, it is not as simple as it seems 
to be. The practice of instant tin talaq has a class 
dimension and cannot be posited as the 
problem of entire community. The lack of 
education and economic development always 
paves the way for multi-layered marginalisation, 
especially for women. The Bharatiya Muslim 
Mahila Andolan’s (BMMA)6 — one of the 
petitioners in the Supreme Court against triple 
talaq — conducted a survey on Muslim women’s 
views on personal law reforms in Maharashtra. 
90% of its sample size asked for a ban on the 
misuse of instant tin talaq, and this report acts 
as the weapon in their struggle for rights. Their 
report titled Seeking Justice Within Family: A 
National Study on Muslim Women’s Views on 
Reforms in Muslim Personal Law has also shown 
that those women who raised voices against 
talaq were socio-economically equally 
organisation also raises voice for socio-economic 
development of the community (BMMA Report, 2012). 
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vulnerable. Another important point is that it 
also highlights the rise of collective struggle of 
women from within and the emergence of a 
gender-inclusive interpretation of Islam from 
the marginalised. In 1985 during Shah Bano 
case, the voice for change did not come from 
Muslim women as the collective. In 2017, their 
views have taken a more organised shape in 
different parts of India. The present government 
can locate them as resisters and negotiators; 
this transformation needs to be addressed. 
Bill and the Political Context   
An overall evaluation of the Bill cannot deny the 
politics behind it. The primary purpose as 
declared by the government is gender justice for 
Muslim women. The BJP (Bharatiya Janata 
Party) government is determined to save them 
from the unjust practice of tin talaq. During the 
Uttar Pradesh Elections in 2017, Narendra Modi 
promised gender justice to them. Apparently, it 
seems to be very simple and loaded with the 
spirit of welfare; however, the reality denies the 
simplicity. A proper assessment of the Bill is not 
possible unless the socio-economic and political 
contexts are not taken into consideration. The 
government, which is championing the Bill for 
Muslim women, has closely been associated 
with projecting Muslims as ‘others’ in Indian 
culture, history and politics. It is also aiming 
nothing but creating another stereotype as well 
as a separate class of ‘criminal’ Muslim 
husbands. Abdul Shaban’s study shows that 
most of all Muslim ghettos in Mumbai are 
considered to be the den of criminals by the 
administration; and these perceptions are also 
related to the stigmatisation of the community 
(Shaban 2012, 215).   
                                                          
7 The Srikrishna Commission Report was published in 
1998. This report mainly aimed at unearthing the reasons 
behind the breaking out of communal violence between 
the Hindus and the Muslims in Mumbai after the 
demolition of Babri Masjid in 1992-93. It clearly stated the 
involvement of the political parties like the Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad (VHP) and the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak (RSS) in 
the riots. It provided a detailed account of the role of hate 
speeches used by the right-wing political leaders in 
inciting violence against the Muslim community and this 
report also highlighted the involvement of state 
machinery in violence. Moreover, it also explained how 
A further investigation into the relationship 
between the Rightist parties and Muslims also 
exhibits several instances of their biased 
involvement in communal violence. The 
Srikrishna Commission Report (1998) clearly 
explained the role of the ruling party and 
administration in Mumbai communal riots in 
1992-93.7 The memory of Gujarat carnage in 
20028 is still alive. As Dibyesh Anand mentioned, 
the anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat in 2002 
indicated how the forces of Hindutva acted as 
tools to legitimise violence; killers became 
defenders and death as non-death (Anand 2012, 
297). The question is: what has the role of the 
government been in delivering justice to those 
Muslim women victims? It seems that gender 
justice on tin talaq is easier than delivering 
justice to riot victims who are also supposed to 
be Muslim women. In this context, the new 
avatar of the government as the messiah of 
these women is not beyond scrutiny. The 
question, which ponders over our minds: are 
Muslim women are being used as pawns? Is it an 
aggravation of homogenised stereotypes of 
Muslims as ‘criminals’ and women as ‘victims’? 
The government did not even bother to consult 
these women’s groups and the All India Muslim 
Personal Law Board on the Bill. Muslim women’s 
groups, which fought against talaq, did not 
demand criminalisation. Therefore, can the 
question of reform and change be addressed 
without considering the views from within? It is 
to be remembered that women are not isolated 
from their community. This Bill, to a large 
extent, has hijacked the contribution made by 
these groups. However, the All India Muslim 
Personal Law Board’s standpoint on personal 
law reform has always been very problematic. 
the religious symbols and practice like Maha aarti and 
Namaz become the political sites of contestation and 
mobilisation for revenge (Punwani 2012, 186-88). 
8 The Gujarat carnage is related to Godhra train-burning 
communal violence, which had begun with a fire in coach 
S6 of the Sabarmati Express on 27.02. 2002. It had led to 
massive sectarian violence between the Hindus and the 
Muslim in different parts of Gujarat. After 15 years of 
violence, still, it is unknown that who had lit the fire. 
However, various reports have highlighted the role of the 
Modi government in this violence (Guruswamy, 2017). 
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Since 2005, Muslim women’s groups had 
continuously asked for banning the practice of 
tin talaq, but they have not paid attention to 
them. It also highlights the old debate on 
gender, community and the state in which not 
only the cultural discriminations but also the 
lack of state intervention in private tend to be 
justified on the ground of the minority religion, 
culture and identity. The government’s 
intervention highlights the failure of the AIMPLB 
as the spokesperson for the women. 
A comparative assessment of Muslim Women’s 
Act (1986) and proposed Triple Talaq Bill (2017) 
enables us to understand the politics behind this 
venture. The former addressed women’s rights 
in divorce and the later focused on marriage. It 
highlights the influence of majority-minority 
dynamics behind the Bill; moreover, the power 
play behind the government intervention 
cannot be ruled out. In Shah Bano Case, the 
Supreme Court delivered its verdict in favour of 
Muslim women’s right to maintenance. 
However, the Rajiv Gandhi government could 
not implement the verdict due to vociferous 
opposition by the conservative religious 
leadership; it also moved the right of a divorced 
Muslim woman from the purview of the general 
law of maintenance under S125 of the Cr.PC9 
and placed under special legislation. Therefore, 
Muslim Women’s (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act (1986) replaced the previous 
recurrent maintenance right by a provision for 
‘fair and reasonable lifelong maintenance’. If the 
husband fails to make the settlement, a 
divorced Muslim woman has the right to 
approach the Magistrate’s court for 
enforcement of the right under Section 3 of the 
Act. During this time, many High Courts 
                                                          
9 Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure 1973 is legislation 
for social justice; it provides an adequate remedy for 
seeking support. A follower of any religion can apply for 
maintenance under this section (Agnes, 2012). 
10 Vinayak Damodar Savarkar developed the ideology of 
Hindutva. He coined this term in 1923 to express the 
totality of the cultural, historical, and above all the 
national aspects along with the religious one, which 
defines the Hindu people as a unitary category. It 
comprehends the Hindu people as the Hindu Rashtra; 
Hindutva is the ideology of Hindu Rashtra. The doctrine is 
also based on the concepts of Pitribhumi (Fatherland) and 
interpreted this judgment positively, and 
women could secure their maintenance rights. 
However, the opposition criticised the Congress 
government for its appeasement policies 
towards the minority community; raised 
questions on the nature of Indian secularism 
where the relationship between religion, 
personal laws and fundamental rights remains 
problematic. 
Moreover, the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) 
politics and outlook towards the community has 
been problematic on several accounts, and the 
recent Bill is just one of its reflections. The Triple 
Talaq Bill (2017) tends to serve justice and 
security for Muslim women. However, the rise 
of right-wing Hindutva10 politics since the 1990s 
itself represented the Muslims as ‘danger’ and 
‘threat to security’. As Dibyesh Anand rightly 
points out that Muslims are discursively 
produced as enemies and sources of insecurity. 
Therefore, ‘crimnalisation’ clause in the 
proposed Bill further reinforces their images as 
‘other’. Since a mere utterance of the word 
“talaq” does not dissolve the marriage and no 
injury is caused to the state or an individual, how 
can it be construed as a criminal offence? After 
the constitution bench’s ruling, the word “talaq” 
has lost its legal validity and power to dissolve a 
Muslim marriage (Anand 2012, 287-290). 
The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Marriage) Bill, 2017 is meant as a throwback to 
the statute enacted in 1986, the Muslim Women 
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act. Through a 
creative interpretation, this statute has 
protected a divorced Muslim wife’s lump sum 
maintenance as fair and reasonable settlement, 
a right that has far more advantages for a 
Punyabhumi (Holyland) to which Muslims and Christians 
do not belong to; moreover, in Savarkar’s words 
Mohammadan and Christian communities possess all the 
essential qualifications of Hindutva but the main point of 
difference is that: they do not look upon India as their 
Holyland. Their Holyland is far off in Arabia and Palestine. 
Their mythology and Godmen, ideas and heroes are not 
the children of the soil. Consequently, their names and 
outlook smack of foreign origin. Their love is divided. 
Hence, it leads to the development of the self-contained 
political ideology of hate (Noorani 2015, 64-68). 
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divorced wife than the earlier provision and has 
better protected the rights of divorced Muslim 
women than their counterparts from other 
religions. Despite this, popular discourses tried 
to portray the Muslim Women (Protection of 
Rights on Divorce) Act as a statute that has 
deprived Muslim women of their crucial right of 
maintenance. The enactment is viewed as a 
backward move of “Muslim appeasement” by 
the Rajiv Gandhi-led Congress government and 
a glaring example of the failure of the state’s 
commitment to secularism at the behest of 
Muslim religious fundamentalists. This new Bill 
is trying to provide a more ‘radical view’ on 
marriage and divorce and building the image of 
Hindu man as the saviour of Muslim sisters 
(Mandal, 2017). In the words of Flavia Agnes, the 
Muslim male is projected as backward, 
obscurantist, and misogynist, and the women as 
helpless victims and devoid of agency (Agnes, 
2018). Therefore, the notion of gender justice 
has taken a more political shape in our popular 
discourses. 
Conclusion: Is this Bill Going to be the Symbol 
of Muslim Women’s Empowerment? 
The article set out to critically review The Triple 
Talaq Bill introduced on 28 December 2017 in 
the Lok Sabha by Mr. Ravi Shankar Prasad, the 
honourable Minister of Law and Justice. Now 
the most important question is: will the bill 
really serve the purpose of Muslim women in 
India? Should the abolition of the practice of 
talaq be considered as the only mechanism for 
their empowerment? The most important 
question: is this Bill an illusion or symbol of 
gender justice for Muslim Women? The need for 
protection in marriage is always an important 
factor; however, the overall socio-economic 
condition of the community and its mind-set is 
equally a significant dimension to be addressed. 
What needs to be recognised is: discriminations 
both in public and private spheres have to be 
addressed; a partial perspective on gender 
justice, bypassing their socio-economic 
vulnerabilities, will not empower these women. 
The ‘protectionist’ approach of all Bills and Acts 
will remain fruitless unless there are proper 
education and overall development for the 
women. The responsibility of family and 
community in this respect should also be 
counted, as the cultivation of values is bestowed 
upon them. It cannot be denied that whenever 
Muslim women have raised voices against 
injustice, they have received sheer criticisms 
from within the community. Ishrat Jehan, who 
was one of the petitioners against the practice 
of triple talaq and polygamy in the Supreme 
Court from Kolkata, faced tremendous 
opposition from her family members and the 
community. She was considered as ‘anti-men’ 
and ‘un-Islamic’ woman. Therefore, the mind-
sets for reform and change have to be 
developed from within the community. Better 
to say, this opposition is also an important part 
of progress. Most importantly, the government, 
which is propagating gender justice for Muslim 
women, must create the atmosphere conducive 
to peace and justice. The silence of the Modi 
government on several issues like mass lynching 
and increasing power of cow invigilation 
committees and the Hindutva forces highlight its 
attitude towards the community. What needs to 
be recognised is that no reform can be trapped 
in a binary between constitutional laws versus 
personal law, freedom versus religion, Article 14 
(right to equality) versus Article 25 (right to 
religion). This watertight division emerges from 
a less-nuanced understanding of Muslim 
women's lives and the perception that they are 
mere ‘objects of reforms' bereft of agency. 
Therefore, the notion of gender justice cannot 
only be defined politically and from a male-
worldview; rather an inclusive approach is 
required, which addresses the voices from the 
below. 
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